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The truth is, we believe, that the real motives of human life, at least of 
those people who do big things, are idealistic in character. The business 
man has the same fundamental psychology as the artist, inventor, or 
statesman. He has set himself at a certain work and the work absorbs and 
becomes himself. It is the expression of his personality; he lives in its 
growth and perfection according to his plans. 
 
Frank Knight (1886-1972), American economist, 
in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 1921. 
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PART I 
THE DECISION OF THE MANAGER 
CHAPTER ONE 
TO ERR IS HUMAN 
 
 
 
On 13 January 2012, the Costa Concordia–one of the biggest and most 
modern cruise ships in the world–was navigating in the Mediterranean 
with 4252 passengers on board. The weather was nice, the sea was calm 
and the ship was sailing along the coast of Italy. At 9:45 p.m., the Costa 
Concordia ran aground and one of the rocks tore a 50-metre gash in the 
hull, flooding the engine room and causing a complete power loss. The 
ship sailed adrift for an hour, and at about 22:45 p.m. capsized and stood 
near the coast partially sunk. The tragic loss of 32 lives stirred up 
compassion around the world. 
The reaction to the accident was immediate. How could a relatively 
new ship, with the most sophisticated navigation systems available, have 
been involved in such an unlikely accident? Emerging as one of the 
leading characters was Captain Francesco Schettino. The captain himself 
later admitted to turning off the automated navigation systems because he 
was familiar with the seabed and wanted to get closer to the coast, 
something he had often done before. Answering a phone call during the 
manoeuvre was enough to distract him. When he realised he was too close 
to the shore it was too late: he was already in shallow waters and the 
accident was inevitable.  
The human factor's role in the whole incident was highlighted in the 
following days. The accident reminded everyone that, no matter how 
advanced technology is, human-caused mistakes will continue to happen. 
Scholars and historians like Edward Tenner have drawn our attention to 
some of the unexpected effects of technology in human decision-making. 
For instance, it has been noticed that introducing safety procedures usually 
leads individuals to adapt to taking more risks because they feel more 
protected. This phenomenon, called the Peltzman effect, explains why 
people began to drive less safely after it became mandatory to wear 
seatbelts. In Tenner's view, it was overconfidence in his own skills and his 
20 years of experience that led the captain of the Costa Concordia to risk 
so much. Such overconfidence stemmed from the trust on the ship's built-
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in quality, on the navigation systems at his disposal, and on his spotless 
record.1 
The crew of a ship like the Costa Concordia have some similarities 
with the people that are part of an organisation such as, for instance, a 
firm. In both cases there is a chain of command with clearly defined tasks 
for each individual. Just like a business manager, a captain like Captain 
Schettino has to manage resources–including human resources–and aim to 
keep his customers satisfied. But there are important differences in both 
roles. In a business there are no satellite navigation devices, navigation 
systems nor accurate nautical charts. The manager can only rely on the 
diverse Economics and Management theories–some of which are 
contradictory– to guide him. The "seas" where the manager "navigates" 
are also much rougher and more unpredictable than the seas usually sailed 
by a ship's captain. While the main sea currents are chartered, the "seas" in 
which the manager has to sail on are not chartered by any means. In those 
"seas" one must include new competitors, new technologies and substitute 
products, changes in taxation and fiscal incentives, the evolution of 
macroeconomic conditions, changes in trends and consumer preferences, 
among many other factors. With the "guidance instruments" at his disposal 
and the conditions of the "seas" in which he navigates, it is no wonder that 
the manager's role is hard to carry out, which often leads to mistakes being 
committed. 
The arguments presented by those who claim that there are no 
management mistakes are widely known. Mistakes are not really mistakes, 
they say. They are decisions that could have been right but, given the 
uncertainty faced by the manager, proved to be wrong thereafter. The 
manager is, in this sense, like an all-knowing explorer pushing forward by 
"trial and error" through unknown territory. Errors are only the price to 
pay for success. As mentioned before, it is true that conditions faced by 
management are, normally, not easy. But not everything can be explained 
by this argument. Managers have to make choices and different managers 
make different choices when faced with the same problem, and some make 
systematically more mistakes than others. Human errors can also happen 
in firms, just as in the command of a ship. 
On the financial side, management errors may translate into capital 
budgeting projects that systematically go over the budget and the time 
limit, into mergers and acquisitions doomed to fail right from the start, in 
the brash entrance into new markets, or in developing new products that, 
in hindsight, should not have seen the light of day. These errors have huge 
costs: wealth destruction for society as a whole, a decrease in the citizens' 
well-being, slower economic growth and lost jobs. 
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When there's an aviation or maritime accident, the first thing 
government agencies do is to investigate the incident that occurred. There 
are enquiries, responsibility is established, the craft's black boxes are 
retrieved and analysed. In short, they try to learn from the incident in order 
to improve both equipment and personnel training to prevent similar 
accidents from happening again. 
It is equally important to understand what are the organisational 
conditions and characteristics that make an individual a good manager. It's 
useful to learn from one's mistakes. You would think financial theory 
would study managers and their decision-making process, considering the 
high social costs that result from their mistakes. Oddly enough, that is not 
the case. 
1.1. Management Errors in Financial Theory 
Mainstream financial theory has largely ignored the manager's 
individual role in the decision-making process. Traditional Finance models 
usually do not consider the manager himself and his personal traits. For 
decades, mainstream Finance has been dominated by the neoclassical 
approach and that explains why the human element has remained absent 
from explanatory models. The neoclassical framework for financial 
problems is based on a set of highly simplifying assumptions about 
available information, competition conditions and the aims pursued by 
each market agent. Simplifying assumptions lead financial problems to be 
analysed as Physics problems where it is assumed that individuals will 
behave as homogeneously and predictably as an Oxygen atom. Since that 
behaviour is assumed to be homogeneous and predictable, all human 
characteristics which make each individual unique and unlike any other 
are disregarded. Managers are seen as an undistinguished resource: any 
manager is a perfect substitute for another in the same way that a one euro 
coin can be substituted for another one euro coin. 
But the human factor is the key to understanding organisations. The 
people that work there behave like human beings–they have psychological 
characteristics. They don't behave like molecules without any awareness 
of themselves, and which for some magical reason must obey the ruling of 
an unfathomable equation. Companies are not abstract concepts; they are, 
in fact, deeply human institutions. 
Therefore the important decisions that have to be made within the firm, 
financial ones being an obvious case, depend on intrinsically human 
factors–limitations, past experiences and individual personality 
characteristics–not solely on strict technical, economical calculations. 
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Interestingly, even the implementation of the aforementioned calculations 
relies on the manager's knowledge, abilities and awareness of them. 
This disregard of the manager's role isn't confined to theoretical 
Finance. In fact, the empirical studies that have been conducted explain a 
firm's financial decisions only with the firm's particular characteristics or 
its business area. The individual role of the manager in those decisions is 
usually ignored. 
Such an incomplete perspective on the business problem has raised 
serious issues. How can we then understand that similar companies, 
operating in the same business industry, often have significantly different 
financial ratios? 
The point is that people make decisions, not companies. And people's 
choices, including those in management positions, are influenced by a set 
of economical, institutional and social factors that are very particular to the 
context where individual decisions are made, but also by one's personal 
characteristics. 
Individuals, even those in management roles, have heterogeneous 
psychological characteristics that can have a relevant impact on the 
decisions made in the firm and, ultimately, on the performance of an 
organisation.2 Therefore, it is also important to try to link those 
psychological idiosyncrasies with the company's results. 
For those that study firms, this analysis is particularly relevant. The 
inside of a firm has often been described as a "black box" because of the 
difficulty to study all its internal processes. The study of the impact of the 
manager's psychological profile in his decisions has contributed to shed 
some light onto that "black box". 
But the interest in studying this issue it not, by far, strictly academic. 
After all, a firm's purpose is not to provide scholars with interesting 
questions. Businesses fulfil an infinitely more important role of creating 
wealth and well-being. In that sense, it is important to emphasise three of 
the main benefits this analysis may bring to the manager. First, the link 
between manager and business performance may allow for the 
identification of personality traits that benefit or hurt the quality of the 
decisions made by managers. This way, recruiters can adjust their 
selection and training processes to favour more desirable psychological 
characteristics when screening for potential managers. 
Secondly, it may help to understand which institutional and corporate 
governance factors are better suited to help a manager achieve his goals 
based on his qualifications and experiences. 
And last but not least, it can be useful for the manager himself because 
he will be able to anticipate the competition's decisions. That implies that 
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the psychological factors that define managers are useful to explain their 
decisions–in itself something already very important–and that disregarding 
those factors may curb managers’ ability to predict the choices made by 
their competitors. 
1.2. Behavioural Finance in the Firm 
The aim of this book is to demonstrate how the personal traits of 
managers affect the decisions made in the firm, especially financial 
decisions. We will see that the psychological qualities of individuals 
holding management positions have a decisive effect on, for instance, their 
financing and capital budgeting decisions or their dividend policy. It will 
also become clear that the psychological profile of each manager will 
provide an explanation for the financial decisions made beyond the scope 
of the company and its business sector. 
There is already a significant number of theoretical and empirical 
works that show the clear effect of psychological variables on investors' 
decisions in financial markets. This book proposes to expand the scope of 
that analysis to include the study of those effects on business managers. 
Introducing psychological factors in the study of organisations and in the 
theory of the firm is a current challenge that must be met. We ought to 
focus more on the way managers think and behave in order to improve 
how businesses are run. 
For some time, the business component of behavioural studies didn't 
progress at the same pace as studies that dealt with investors' decisions. 
The main obstacle was obtaining the necessary data to support empirical 
studies. However, new techniques developed in the last few years have 
allowed us to overcome that standstill and today behavioural studies on 
managers' decisions have grown immensely. We intend to give account of 
that set of studies. 
The perspective chosen for this book can be encompassed in the 
Behavioural Finance framework. Behavioural Finance differs from 
Traditional Finance in the sense that the former considers the impact of an 
individual agent's qualities–particularly their psychological characteristics 
–on decisions. For instance, Behavioural Finance proposes to determine if 
managers suffer from overconfidence when making financial decisions 
and if that overconfidence has any significant impact on their choices. 
While the interest in the relationship between managers' characteristics 
and financial decisions is recent, the idea that managers can be influential 
in the life of a company is not new. Our approach draws its inspiration 
from the behavioural theory of the firm, a study branch that came to light 
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in the 1950s. Among the founding fathers of the behavioural theory of the 
firm are Nobel Economics Prize Laureate Herbert Simon, and also James 
G. March and Richard Cyert.3 For these authors, firm decision makers are 
not capable of making decisions through optimisation processes because 
their rationality has boundaries (bounded rationality). Optimisation would 
require individuals to know all the alternatives available to choose from, 
the consequences of choosing each alternative and the corresponding 
probabilities. Only then would it be possible to create the distribution of 
expected results for each decision alternative. However, maximisation 
solutions are not attainable due to the enormous gap between the 
complexity of the problems addressed by managers and the limits of their 
capabilities (attention, calculation, memory). For that reason, rational 
decisions under uncertainty demand managers to adopt a satisfying 
behaviour instead of a maximising/optimising one. Choices are made 
based on simplified models that only capture the essentials of the problem 
without grasping its full complexity. In addition to that, business managers 
make decisions founded on a set of assumptions that reflect their particular 
cognitive base, their idiosyncrasies, and their psychological profile. These 
assumptions, which evolve over time, limit and distort the manager's 
perception of the information. Consequently, due to managers' cognitive 
limits, their view of the problems being faced is narrow, which in turn 
ends up influencing the choices that are made. 
Despite the mentioned author's proposition that the managers' 
individual psychological factors are the key to understanding their 
decisions, the empirical study of the effects attributable to each 
psychological characteristic had to wait for further developments in the 
field of cognitive Psychology. That took place in particular from the 1980s 
onward with the contributions of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky. 
This book's approach also touches on the upper echelons literature 
initiated by Hambrick and Mason (1984) and followed up by numerous 
authors.4 That contribution, in the field of strategic management and 
organisational theory, stresses the importance of the manager in the firm's 
strategic choices and his performance. An executive officer passes on to 
his decisions and leadership behaviour much of his personality, 
experience, frame of mind and preferences. Institutional restraints that 
limit the decision maker's scope, while important, cannot eliminate that 
effect. Therefore, managers' characteristics allow us to partially envision 
what happens within organisations. 
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Although there is common ground between the approach chosen in this 
book and the contributions of the mentioned authors, it is important to 
clarify that the former differs from the latter in four major points: 
1) Behaviour-based organisational theory tries to establish a link 
between managers and the firms' strategic decisions, that is, the 
more complex and far-reaching decisions. In this book, the focus of 
our analysis is narrower: we will only try to establish a connection 
between managers' psychological profiles and financial decisions; 
2) The object of analysis in upper echelons theory is not the manager 
but the management team. Unlike that theory, our interest lies in 
the impact of each person's psychological characteristics and 
therefore we will make the manager our object of analysis. In spite 
of that, we will give the issue some thought (see chapter 3) given 
that some of the firm's most important financial decisions can be 
group decisions;  
3) In studies conducted within the upper echelons theory framework, 
managers are characterised by a few observable factors that are 
reflected mainly in sociodemographic variables associated with 
managers' personal and professional backgrounds. Our perspective 
is different in the sense that we will favour the study of people's 
psychological characteristics. Those characteristics are hard to 
assess, something that will, obviously, raise analytical difficulties. 
Nonetheless, new approaches have emerged that will allow us, as 
we'll see in the next chapter, to overcome those obstacles; 
4) Empirical studies, in the upper echelons theory, are usually 
sectional. They try to relate observable variables that characterise 
managers with the strategic decisions made within a given set of 
firms. The study methods adopted in the works referred to in this 
book are considerably more diverse. Note that some of those 
methods are typically used in Psychology, such as surveys and 
experimental studies, and that stems from the focus on managers' 
psychological profiles. 
 
Despite those significant differences, some latter developments in 
upper echelons theory have bridged the gap between methods and between 
objects of analysis in Behavioural Finance models.5 
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1.3. Book Layout 
The book is comprised of 15 chapters divided into two parts. 
The first part of the book is comprised of seven chapters where we will 
present the manager's personality and personal traits that can influence his 
choices. In the remaining chapters that constitute the second part of the 
book, we will discuss the effects of behavioural factors in a particular kind 
of choice: financial ones. Throughout this book we will also present a few 
aspects in text boxes that broaden our understanding of the issues 
addressed in the main text. For instance, on pages 24 and 25 we emphasise 
the conclusions reached by a few authors on the effect of managers' 
overconfidence. 
But let us summarise the content of each chapter. 
The next chapter is vital because in it we will lay the foundations to 
understand what makes managers decide in a distinctively different way, 
not only from one another, but also from what is predicted by neoclassical 
Finance. We will explain the psychological foundations of human decision 
and present the main biases that affect managers' choices: overconfidence, 
confirmation, anchoring and availability biases, cognitive dissonance and 
illusion of control. Because of its importance we will pay special attention 
to the study of managerial overconfidence. Scenario analysis and the 
mistakes made by executives in their planning (hence the name planning 
fallacy) will also be broached. 
The firm's management decisions are often made by a group. It is, 
therefore, important to understand how decisions made collectively are 
influenced by the group's particular members. From the business 
management perspective, it is useful to identify the characteristics 
displayed by groups that are capable of making the best choices. These are 
the objectives for the third chapter of the book. 
In chapter 4 we will tackle three distinct subjects–managers’ learning, 
competition between managers, and management incentives–that are 
usually resorted to in the argument against the prevalence of psychological 
effects in management decisions. In that chapter we will see how, in spite 
of the managers’ learning, competition and incentives, psychological 
effects are indeed relevant in their choices. 
The fifth chapter deals with decisions made by entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs, as business founders, face specific problems. Because of 
that, decision biases also have specific effects when we consider this class 
of agents. 
In the sixth chapter we will ponder the impact of the manager on the 
firm's performance. To do that, we will have to consider not only the 
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manager's characteristics but also the institutional environment where the 
decisions are made. 
In the following chapter, the seventh, we will draw on the relationship 
between managers' life experiences and the choices made in firms. We 
will see that some life experiences–for instance, experience in the military 
or having gone through an economic recession–leave lasting marks on 
professionals and in all their future decisions. 
Having established the behavioural principles and their effects on 
decisions made by managers, we will then proceed to analyse how those 
professionals make financial decisions. That will be the objective of the 
following chapters. 
In chapter 8 we will present the effects of the manager's psychology on 
capital budgeting decisions. That insight will allow us to understand why 
business investments are often overdue and over budget. The reluctance 
shown by managers to drop projects that are bound to fail is another 
subject that will be addressed in this chapter. 
Chapter 9 will be about financing decisions. Traditional models cannot 
explain the equity structure displayed by many firms. As we will see, 
behavioural effects like overconfidence are useful to understanding 
managers' choices. 
Dividend policy is the subject of chapter 10. We will approach the 
shareholders' demand for dividends and the managers' reaction to that 
demand. Manager surveys constitute an invaluable source of information 
to understanding how this group decides how much companies should pay 
in dividends. 
Chapter 11 will elaborate on one of the most important financial 
decisions: the decisions to merge or to acquire. As we will be able to see, 
behavioural effects are the key to understanding managers' choices on the 
number of mergers and acquisitions made, the amounts paid by the 
acquiring company to the shareholders of the target company, and also on 
the consequences for shareholders wealth. 
But managers are not the only ones affected by decision biases. 
Financial market investors are also influenced by behavioural factors in 
such a way as to drive prices too high or too low. That is why we will, in 
chapter 12, address the reactions of unbiased managers to inefficient 
financial markets to conclude that corporate executive officers can 
opportunistically exploit market under- and overvaluations. 
Having debated the consequences of managers' psychological traits in 
firms' decisions, in chapter 13 we will be ready to understand whether 
those consequences are beneficial or damaging. 
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Chapter 14 undertakes the study of the relation between the 
organisation's culture and the personality characteristics of those that are a 
part of it. As will become clear, certain competitive environments heighten 
or lessen managers' personal characteristics with relevant effects in their 
behaviour. The impact of corporate culture and individuals' behavioural 
factors in frauds and in the tampering of corporate results is another issue 
that will be brought to the fore. 
The last chapter has a different nature. Behavioural principles and 
one's psychological traits reflect on choices that go far beyond the 
corporate universe. Therefore, in chapter 15 we will present a set of 
examples that illustrate the importance of behavioural factors on choices 
as diverse as the ones made by politicians, military leaders at war, or 
scientists in pursuit of knowledge. 
Notes
                                                 
1 Janssen (1994); Tenner (2012a, 2012b). 
2 On that very subject, Peter Drucker, one of the fathers of Management Studies, 
noted: «Some of the best business and non-profit CEOs I’ve worked with over a 
65-year consulting career were not stereotypical leaders. They were all over the 
map in terms of their personalities, attitudes, values, strengths, and weaknesses. 
They ranged from extroverted to nearly reclusive, from easygoing to controlling, 
from generous to parsimonious» (Drucker, 2004, p. 58). On the heterogeneity of 
people's choices, see also Heckman (2000). 
3 Simon (1947, 1982); March and Simon (1958); Cyert and March (1963). 
4 For instance, see the revision made by Hambrick (2007) and the literature review 
by Carpenter et al. (2004). 
5 For instance, Hambrick (2007) suggests resorting to experimental methods to 
study the effect of management teams in firms' strategic decisions. On the same 
article, the author also states that upper echelons theory only adopts the 
management team as object of analysis (and not the top manager as an individual) 
because, purportedly, the empirical studies will yield better results. 
CHAPTER TWO 
HUMAN DECISION IN THE FIRM 
(AND OUTSIDE) 
 
 
 
2.1. A Biased Mind 
In the last few decades, a large set of studies on social and cognitive 
Psychology have shown that people don't see the world as it is. In that 
sense, we can say that our perspective of the world is imperfect. To 
understand that "imperfection"–let’s call it this for now–we must 
understand its source, its raison d'être. To do so, we will approach the 
topic in two distinct stages. In the first stage we are going to explain the 
cause of that 'imperfection'. In the second, we will define what led some of 
the environment's characteristics to become 'invisible' to human beings–all 
of us–and what made others so self-evident. 
Let us begin the first stage: why don't we see the world as it is? The 
'imperfection' we refer to is a result of the mismatch between the massive 
volume of available information in our environment and the limited 
cognitive resources available to process it. Our memory capacity and 
attention is limited when compared to the existing information and that 
makes us able to process only subsets of that information. In addition, the 
amount of time available to perceive the relevant data is also an important 
constraint. We often have deadlines to decide–imagine the case of a 
business manager–and what we can understand of those problems, the 
information we have to process to do so, is usually curtailed by those 
deadlines. Because of those reasons it is said that human rationality is 
limited and that those limits translate into a 'skewed' perspective of reality. 
But why do we find some characteristics of reality more important than 
others? Let us move on to the second stage of our analysis of the problem. 
To understand rationality, i.e., the way by which we perceive problems in 
reality and how we try to solve them, we must consider another factor: 
evolution. How we apprehend the world around us, and also the economic 
problems that are comprised in that world, rely on mankind's evolution as 
a species throughout millions of years. In fact, it was that evolution and 
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the species selection process that made us what we are today: more 
sensitive to some characteristics of reality and less to others. Therefore, 
the fact that we have a certain vision of reality, that is, a skewed vision, 
need not be understood as an imperfection but as our way to respond to the 
environmental conditions in which the human species has evolved over 
time. To elaborate more on this issue is well beyond the scope of this book 
but, still, for the more curious reader, we would like to quote from Felix 
Goodson's The Evolution and the Function of Cognition (2002):  
 
«Let me emphasize again that all living things are functional analogues, 
reflections of the selection pressures that defined the particular ecological 
niches in which they evolved. This is also true of human beings. (…) Our 
cognitive world is a functional not a literal analogue; colours, sounds, and 
odours exist only in our heads, but they are functional translations of 
energy shifts in the external environment. The three-dimensional character 
of our cognitive world is not a literal reflection of the external world; 
selection pressures (…) insured that certain vital features are emphasized, 
while less important ones are diminished or missing altogether» (pp. 78-9). 
 
Now we understand why we don't perceive the world as it is. Our 
perception is not neutral: we are sensitive to the characteristics of the 
outside world that are more important for our survival and less sensitive to 
all others. But that raises a difficult problem for social scientists who want 
to study financial decisions made in an economy. If we cannot really see 
the existing world as it is, how can we study what makes people decide in 
one way or the other? Goodson (2002) continues:  
 
«This analysis suggests that the only reality is our subjective experience, 
that we can never compare your red with my red (…), etc. This is true, but 
this does not mean that each of us is isolated in solipsistic loneliness. As 
members of the same species with a shared evolutionary history, we may 
assume that our information-processing machinery works in similar ways. 
Insofar as our cognitive world is a functional duplicate, we can know about 
and interact with the external world, and, insofar as we are functionally 
alike, we can communicate» (p. 79). 
 
From this we can draw two major conclusions. The first is that our 
perception of the world does not correspond to the actual world, meaning 
we have a biased perception of reality. We may think we decide in a 
completely rational and objective way but no matter how hard we try that 
simply is not true. It is important to realise that the source of those biases 
makes them even more dangerous because we're not aware of them when 
we decide: it is our very own perception of the world–and the only one we 
have–that is skewed. Some authors compare those cognitive biases to an 
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optical illusion. Optical illusions occur regardless of our will and knowing 
that what we are looking at is an optical illusion does not prevent us from 
experiencing its effect. 
The second major conclusion is that biases that affect a population tend 
to be similar because we all experienced the same evolutionary process. 
That means that biases are not random but rather follow a certain pattern. 
The role of the social scientist that sets out to study any problem–in 
our case, to understand the way people make financial decisions–is to 
strive to know the pattern of biases that characterise individuals’ choices. 
To that purpose, in the last decades several psychologists have empirically 
identified a set of biases that, from a practical standpoint, lead individuals 
to make decisions that are contrary to conventional Finance theories.1 
We will then present some of the effects that result from the biases 
faced by individuals when making decisions of an economic or financial 
nature. We will allude to the framing effects, to the violation of the 
dominance principle, and to loss aversion. From point 2.2 onwards we will 
focus on characterising the biases themselves. 
a) Framing Effects 
Financial and economic decisions often involve what we call risk. It is 
important to understand whether the decisions that are made depend solely 
on the substance of the problem or also on the way they are presented. To 
approach the subject we will start by describing the problems faced by the 
test subjects of an experiment run by a few psychologists in 1981.2 
The subjects were given the following problem: 
 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to 
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific 
estimates of each programme's consequences are as follows: 
 
If Programme A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Programme B is adopted, there is 1/3  probability that 600 people will 
be saved, and 2/3  probability that no one will be saved. 
 
Which of the two programmes would you favour? 
 
From the 152 people that were asked to answer, the majority (72%) 
chose Programme A. 28% chose Programme B. 
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It should be noted that the choices are expressed in terms of lives saved 
(it is the survival framing) and that the majority of the choices reflects risk 
aversion. That happened because most people prefer a programme that 
saves 200 lives with certainty rather than a risky alternative with an equal 
expected value of lives saved: 
(1/3 * 600 + 2/3 * 0 = 200)  
 
The same problem was proposed to a group of 115 people but the 
alternatives were presented in a different fashion: 
 
If Programme C is adopted 400 people will die. 
If Programme D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, 
and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. 
 
Which of the two programmes would you favour? 
 
Note that the choices are presented in terms of fatalities, but the 
alternatives are essentially the same that were presented to the first test 
group. Programme A is similar to Programme C and Programme B is 
similar to Programme D. 
However, the choices made are significantly different: most people 
(78%) chose Programme D and only 22% preferred Programme C. 
This choice shows that most individuals are risk prone. The certain 
death of 400 people is less acceptable than a probability of 2/3  that 600 
people will die. 
On a number of occasions the same people answered both versions of 
the problem with their inconsistency being pointed out to them. Even so, 
many people kept their intention of remaining risk averse in the survival 
framing and risk prone in the mortality framing, although they expressed 
that they wished both answers were consistent. 
Changing the framing leads the subjects to change their choice. Similar 
results to this form a pattern: the same results were attained with 
individuals of different academic levels and interests–university students, 
university professors or people that, in principle, would be more used to 
make choices like the ones from the problem, such as physicians or nurses. 
In this case, the choices were expressed in terms of lives saved/deaths, but 
similar results are found when the proposed choices are of a monetary or 
financial nature. 
The reasons for that attitude towards risk can be found in the 
boundaries of human rationality and in the theory of evolution. As stated 
by Kahneman (2003, p. 1459):  
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«The basic principle of framing is the passive acceptance of the 
formulation given. Because of this passivity, people fail to construct a 
canonical representation for all extensionally equivalent descriptions of a 
state of affairs. (…) Invariance cannot be achieved by a finite mind». 
 
The theory of evolution also allows us to understand why normally risk 
averse individuals exhibit risk prone choices when faced with the 
possibility of a loss. Those reasons can be found in natural selection 
processes: it is harder to reverse the consequences of an attack (a wrong 
choice in case of loss) than of a squandered opportunity (a wrong choice in 
case of success).3 
Individuals that are risk averse in choices that involve gains are the 
same individuals that are risk prone in choices that involve losses. This 
pattern raises a serious question. The theories that we have in Finance do 
not take into account the way problems are framed. If individuals' choices 
alter significantly depending on how a problem is presented, how can we 
create theories that allow us to predict their choices? The same people 
facing the same problem have systematically different answers depending 
on how the problem is framed. 
How can we then build models on choice theory? There are two 
possible options. The first is the path walked by Finance in the last 50 
years. Traditional Finance models assume that individuals' choices are 
consistent, that is, an individual will make the same choices regardless of 
how the problem is presented. This is the invariance principle. Ignoring 
the framing effect allows for normative models, meaning models that 
describe how an individual should act according to criteria of logical 
consistency. 
But the framing effect shows that individuals' choices are, in fact, not 
consistent. And so we have another path, another approach to choice 
theories in Finance. We can then build models that describe the choices 
that are indeed made, thus enabling us to predict their decisions. In this 
second path models lose normativity (individuals' choices are inconsistent) 
but gain realism and effective predictive ability. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986, p. 251) wrote on the subject: «…no 
theory of choice can be both normatively adequate and descriptively 
accurate». 
We now understand that individuals may choose differently even when 
faced with the same problem and that reveals inconsistent choices. The 
same individual may stop being risk averse and become risk prone if the 
way the problem is presented changes. What are the implications of that 
fact? The following example will help us to answer that question. 
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b) Violation of the Dominance Principle 
Again, we have an experimental study. Each of the 150 test subjects 
were called upon to make two choices. The problem was as follows:4 
 
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First 
examine both decisions and then indicate the options you prefer. 
 
Decision 1: Choose between: 
A. a sure gain of $240 [84 per cent] 
B. 25% chance of gaining $1,000, and 75% chance of gaining nothing 
[16 per cent] 
 
Decision 2: Choose between: 
C. a sure loss of $750 [13 per cent] 
D. 75% chance of losing $1000, and 25% chance of losing nothing [87 
per cent] 
 
The percentage of choice for each option is between brackets. On 
Decision 1 it is hard to refuse the alternative of a sure gain of 240 dollars 
when the alternative is a 75% possibility of not winning anything. Most 
subjects (85%) chose option A. With Decision 2 it is hard to accept the 
certain loss of 750 dollars. The majority of subjects (87%) decide to risk in 
order of getting a 25% probability of losing nothing even if they have to 
accept a 75% chance of losing 1000 dollars to secure that. 
Note that the choice of the majority on Decision 1 suggests that people 
are risk averse while the majority's choice on Decision 2 is consistent with 
risk propensity. As we have seen in the previous point, this is a common 
pattern: in choices involving gains (like Decision 1) people are usually risk 
averse and in choices involving losses (as in Decision 2) they tend to be 
risk prone. 
Since the subjects analysed the pairs of choices simultaneously, they 
have in fact expressed a preference for alternatives A and D to alternatives 
B and C. 
To confirm that, we will group those two pairs of alternatives together. 
Therefore, we have: 
 
A+D: 25% probability of winning 240 dollars and 75% probability of 
losing 760 dollars 
B+C: 25% probability of winning 250 dollars and 75% probability of 
losing 750 dollars 
 
Chapter Two 
 
 
18
In theory, B+C is clearly better than A+D. But note what is happening 
here: the fact that individuals make inconsistent choices–some risk averse, 
some risk prone–can have major repercussions even when making 
financial decisions. Most people end up making suboptimal choices 
because of this inconsistent preference pattern, as we have demonstrated in 
the example. 
When the alternatives are presented in an aggregate way, the choice is 
clear and people choose easily the combination B+C. But when the 
alternatives are not aggregated, choices are very different: 73% of the test 
subjects chose A and D and only 3% chose B and C. The contrast between 
choices in the two formats is another example of a violation of the 
invariance principle. Results like these are systematic. They have been 
repeated several times in different contexts and with different test groups. 
We conclude then that the inconsistency of preferences may violate a 
fundamental tenet of normative theories which is the dominance principle, 
meaning the principle that says that individuals choose the best 
alternatives. In practice, not only our choices are inconsistent–they vary 
according to the way problems are presented–but that inconsistency leads 
us to make the worst choices. 
We are confronted yet again with the evident dilemma faced by 
Finance and, for that matter, all other areas of Science where decision 
theory is fundamental. If one presumes individuals make the best choices, 
i.e., that they follow the dominance principle, we can create theories that 
can describe how individuals should decide. Those normative models, 
however, cannot predict how people will decide. When it comes time to 
decide, most individuals violate the principle of dominance when the way 
the alternatives are presented induces inconsistent preferences. 
 
Inconsistency in choice is also at the root of another effect with clear 
implications in financial choices: loss aversion. 
c) Loss Aversion 
Suppose you're asked to play a game: 
 
"I'm going to toss a coin. If the outcome is heads you win 150 euros, if 
it is tails you lose 100 euros". 
 
Would you accept to play this game? If you are like the majority of 
people you will not accept to play. This sort of behaviour is somewhat 
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surprising since it involves a game with a positive expected value 
(assuming the coin isn't rigged, of course).  
This result illustrates the so-called loss aversion effect.5 Loss aversion 
occurs because the dissatisfaction caused by a loss is greater than the 
satisfaction one draws from an equivalent gain. Evidence suggests that 
loss aversion makes most individuals reject a game if the odds of winning 
or losing are the same unless the potential gain is, at least, twice the 
amount of the potential loss. This means that, again, people do exactly the 
opposite of what one would expect according to conventional financial 
theory. In general, people will only accept to lose 100 euros with a 50% 
probability if, on the other hand, the possible winnings with a 50% 
probability equals, at the very least, 200 euros.6 
These simple examples illustrate the effects that decision biases may 
have in choices–including financial choices. Experimental studies show 
that bias effects are frequent, significant and systematic. They are frequent 
because they affect most decision makers when confronted with choices 
that imply some risk. They are significant because the deviations to the 
expected are often very pronounced. And they are systematic because the 
errors found in experimental studies do not seem to be random; in fact, the 
same kind of mistake occurs when the decision is made in a similar 
context. These results confirm what one would have expected to observe 
in individuals that share the same evolutionary history. 
The effects we have just described apply to most people. Logically it is 
plausible to think that they will also affect managers and their financial 
decisions. 
But what is the effect of behavioural biases in the multitude of 
financial decisions made by a manager? To answer that question we have 
to examine the biases, searching in them the implications for the business 
financial decisions. 
Therefore, we will now present some of the main behavioural biases 
susceptible to influencing the choices made by managers. This analysis is 
the first step to understanding in which circumstances and in what sense 
can management decisions diverge from the premises put forward by 
conventional Finance. 
2.2. Overconfidence 
a) Introduction 
Overconfidence may be defined as the belief that one’s decision-
making, thinking and other abilities are greater than what they actually are. 
Chapter Two 
 
 
20
This exaggerated belief in one's abilities affects most people in such a way 
that De Bondt and Thaler (1995, p. 389) find that overconfidence is 
«[p]erhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment (…)». 
Other authors like, for instance, Taylor and Brown (1988, p. 198) go as far 
as saying that overconfidence is a trait of healthy human thought: «Yet 
considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive self-
evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic 
optimism are characteristic of normal human thought». Just so we know 
the prevalence of this bias, research conducted with over 2,000 managers 
suggests that less than 1% did not display signs of overconfidence.7 
Overconfidence may manifest itself in two clearly different moments: 
when deciding, and after the decision is made. In the first case, individuals 
show an excess of confidence in their predictions which means they think 
they can predict the future better than what they really can. This effect is 
observed before knowing if the prediction is correct or not and is what 
makes individuals place their estimates in confidence intervals that are too 
narrow. It stems from this that, when overconfident managers are asked to 
give an estimate of the value of a potential investment and its confidence 
interval, the answers translate into too narrow confidence intervals when 
the past suggests that the prediction's standard deviation should be 
greater.8 This effect occurs because overconfident people overvalue the 
importance of the information they have, undervalue the inherent risk of 
their choices, and are too slow to incorporate any additional piece of 
information that may help them assess the situation more accurately.9 
After the decision is made, individuals affected by this bias may 
manifest an excess of confidence in the assessment of the problems they 
are faced with. That may happen because individuals overvalue their 
skills. For instance, after executing an investment, overconfident managers 
are usually little prepared for the possibility of taking losses. 
Consequently, they are exaggeratedly surprised or disappointed if the 
investment does not perform as expected. 
The overestimation of one's own skills that is at the base of 
overconfidence manifests itself in the so-called "better than average" 
effect where the majority of people believe they are more skilled than the 
rest. Simple surveys show that most people (usually between 70% and 
80%) believe to be better than average drivers. Similar results were found 
in health and management skills surveys, and on one's business success 
prospects.10 
This exaggerated feeling of certainty and control which is typical of 
overconfidence makes individuals have an optimistic feeling towards the 
future. In other words, individuals will often manifest a systematic 
